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Governments often have the power to take property rights from private citizens but their responsibility to 
pay compensation is typically not well specified. In this paper we examine how the compensation rule 
adopted by a country affects both private investment decisions and takings decisions. We build on a 
widely accepted argument that any lump sum compensation, including zero, is the socially optimal 
compensation scheme. The lump sum compensation result hinges critically on the assumptions that the 
government maximizes social welfare and that the level of private investment does not affect the 
alternative use of the property rights. We find that when either of these assumptions is relaxed, the 
optimal compensation scheme will generally depend upon market values. The model presented here 
provides strong support for market value compensation for the taking of property rights in modern 
societies. 
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 One of the major activities of modern governments is the granting of
special privileges to various groups of politically inﬂuential people.
Gordon Tullock (1975), The Transitional Gains Trap
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Governments have the power to take property rights away from private citizens. While
such discretion can be used to increase social welfare, it can, as the quote from Tullock
(1979) suggests, form the basis of a government moral hazard problem, a situation
w h e r et h ep o w e rt ot a k ei su s e dp r i m a r i l yt ob e n e ﬁt one group in society at the expense
of another. In this paper we examine the ways in which binding compensation rules
can be used to balance the costs and beneﬁts of granting governments the power to
take property when they are subject to moral hazard.
The literature that we build on has not provided much analysis of government
moral hazard. In the absence of government moral hazard, a very simple, but con-
troversial, compensation rule has been suggested: zero compensation. The intuition
behind the zero compensation result, put forth an inﬂuential paper by Blume, Ru-
binfeld and Shapiro (1984)–henceforth BRS, is straightforward and best illustrated
with a simple example. Consider an individual who wishes to build a house on a tract
of land. There is a 50% chance that, at some future point in time, social welfare can
be improved by the construction of a road through the property. If this happens, the
house will have to be destroyed. If compensation for the expropriation is based on
market value, then the individual will ignore the expropriation possibility in decid-
ing how much to spend on the house: The individual’s optimal investment level will
equate private beneﬁt to private cost independent of the probability of a loss. Since
this ignores the social cost of destroying a valuable asset, an ineﬃciency results in
that there will be overinvestment from a social perspective. On the other hand, if
compensation is a lump sum that is independent of the amount spent, then expected
private costs (the expected loss of the house) will reﬂect social costs and an eﬃcient
investment decision will be made.
The BRS zero compensation result is controversial because, in practice, courts
have shown a preference for using market value as the appropriate level of compen-
sation. And many legal and economic commentators seem to generally support this
preference. For instance, Fischel and Shapiro (1988) state “If pressed on the question,
most economists and lawyers would, we believe, conclude that the government should
pay for the property that it takes. The argument, especially that of economists, might
be that forcing the government to pay for the resources it gets promotes eﬃciency.”1
In this paper we show that the noncompensation result is critically linked to the
assumptions that a) there is no government moral hazard and b) private investment
1Fischel and Shapiro (1989) refer speciﬁcally to Baxter and Altree (1972), DeAlessi (1969) and
Epstein (1985).
1has no social value if property rights are taken. We show that relaxing either of these
assumptions leads to a compensation rule that will depend upon market value.
For the most part, market value is shown to be important in our analysis because
we consider cases where the government charged with implementing the taking deci-
sion favors particular constituencies. Although this case has received scant attention,
there exists ample evidence which suggests that governments, politicians, and courts
behave in this manner. For example, ﬁrst state constitutions in the US did not specify
any compensation for government takings because people had faith in the legislations
to do the right thing, (Treanor (1985)). Later on, when faith in the legislatures to do
the right thing declined, states amended their constitutions by imposing just compen-
sation clauses. Society, it appears, believed that governments were capable of taking
actions that were not in their best interests and responded by protecting themselves
with compensation clauses.
One famous case where court taking discretion favored one party over another is
Miller v. Schoene. Here, ornamental cedar trees were infected with a fungus that were
harmless to the cedar but fatal to apple trees. The courts ordered that the cedars be
felled without compensation to the owners. The courts clearly put the preferences
of one group in society over another by arguing that “Apple growing is one of the
principle agricultural pursuits in Virginia.”2
Heller and Krier (1999) more generally note the extent to which discretion has
been prevalent in actual taking cases: “Supreme Court decisions over the last three-
quarters of a century have turned the words of the Taking Clause into a secret code
that only a momentary majority of the Court is able to understand. The Justices
faithfully moor their opinions to the particular terms of the Fifth amendment, but
only by stretching the text beyond recognition.”
It is not clear, however, whether takings decisions always favor one group in society
over another. For instance, with respect to land taking decisions in the US, Carlson
and Pollack (2001) note that “Since 1987, the Supreme Court has given scholars
ample material to expound upon by deciding numerous takings cases, virtually all
of them in favor of the property owner.” On the other hand, there is concern that
regulatory takings decisions will be so harmful to property owners that they will
undermine infrastructure investment. As Rose-Ackerman and Rossi (2000) put it:
“How does a state attract foreign investment where there is some possibility that the
commitments behind its current regulatory regime may change? Like deregulation in
the United States, legal, political and regulatory transitions in developing countries
pose political and regulatory risks that may undermine investor conﬁdence, at great
cost to their economies.”
In this paper we formally model the notion that a government favors one con-
stituency over another and show that market value compensation can be used as
an eﬀective tool for mitigating the ineﬃciencies associated with such behavior. The
papers in the literature that are closest to this one are Fischel and Shapiro (1989),
2276 US 272 (1928). This and many other cases are discussed in Heller and Krier (1999)
2Hermalin (1994), and Miceli and Segerson (1994). However, none of these papers
come to the conclusion that compensation should be related to the market value of
the taken property.
Fischel and Shapiro (1989) consider a situation where the government’s takings
decision is determined by maximizing the welfare of the majority of voters. Although
they conclude that the compensation schedule will be some positive fraction of market
value, they unduly restrict the form of the compensation schedule. Speciﬁcally, they
rule out any form of lump sum payments.3 When compensation is allowed to be a
linear function–with a non-zero constant–of the market value, it can be shown that
the set of ﬁrst-best allocations can now be implemented and the form of the optimal
compensation is a simply lump sum payment.
Hermalin’s (1994) model is motivated by informational asymmetries between the
government and investor. He assumes that the government takes private property
only if the beneﬁt to society exceeds the price that the government must pay for the
property. With these kinds of preferences the government may end up taking private
property when it is not socially optimal to do so. Hermalin’s main conclusion is that
“eﬃciency requires compensating the citizen based not on what she loses, but rather
on what society gains from the taking.” That is, market value compensation should
not be used.
Finally, Miceli and Segerson (1994) consider a model where the government suﬀers
from “ﬁscal illusion.” A government suﬀers from ﬁscal illusion if it only considers the
actual and not social costs in its decision making. Miceli and Segerson’s (1994) ex
post rule requires that the government compensate the investor at market-value only
if the expropriation is not socially eﬃcient; a socially eﬃcient expropriation does not
require compensation. Since, in equilibrium, the government does not expropriate
if it is not socially eﬃcient, compensation will be zero and, thus, independent of
market-value.4
In the next section we set out our model. We consider the decision of a government
that can remove rights to harvest timber so as to develop a wilderness park, where the
right holder, the “logger,” has made an earlier investment in developing the timber
stand. The “campers” in society will beneﬁt from the development of a wilderness
park. In section 3, the set of ﬁrst-best allocations are described. As a benchmark we
analyze the case where government moral hazard is absent in section 4. In section
5, the implications of having private investment aﬀecting the alternative value of the
property is examined. Sections 6 and 7 examine the impact of government moral
hazard; section 6 assumes that the government cares only about campers and section
7 assumes it only cares about loggers. Section 8 summarizes and concludes.
3Fishel and Shapiro’s constitutional conference, where the form of the compensation schedule is
determined, can be viewed as a regulation problem. The importance of ﬁx e dp a y m e n t si nc o m p e n -
sation is well known in the regulation literature.
4In a model of a homogeneous population of investors, where one investor is “elected” to form a
government, Nosal (2001) ﬁnds that market value compensation is always optimal.
32M o d e l
We examine the problem faced by a social planner designing a rule that will determine
the amount, K, that will be paid to anyone whose property is taken. The social
planner puts a compensation rule in place at date t =0and it applies to property
that may be taken at date t =2 . The social planner is equally concerned with the
welfare of two agents, a logger and a camper, and weighs equally their welfare, L and
C, respectively. That is, the social planner’s objective is to maximize
W = L + C.
The logger is endowed with a unit of capital and a unit of land. Capital is non-
storable, perfectly divisible, and can be allocated over two production technologies,
one of which requires land and one that does not. For convenience, we will refer to
the technology that requires land as tree planting and the technology that does not
as the safe project. Let x ∈ [0,1] denote the amount of capital that is allocated to
tree planting. The logger makes his investment decision at date t =1 .
Outputs are realized at date t =3 . The safe project produces g(1 − x),w h e r e
g0 > 0, g00 < 0,a n dg0(y) →∞as y → 0. Tree planting produces θxτ,w h e r eθ is
a stochastic productivity shock, τ ∈ {0,1},a n dτ =1means that the logger retains
his property rights and τ =0means that he does not. When the logger’s property
rights are taken both the investment and potential output, θx,a r el o s t .A tt h es a m e
time, however, a taking produces a stochastic beneﬁto fβ to the camper; the camper
gets to enjoy a wilderness park. We will refer to β as the alternative private value of
the logger’s land.
At t =1 , when the logger makes his investment decision, the values of θ, τ and
β are not known. We assume that θ ≥ 0 is distributed according to the density
f(θ),w h e r ef(θ) > 0 ∀ θ ∈ [θ0,θ1] and f(θ)=0otherwise; and β ≥ 0 is distributed
according to the density h(β),w h e r eh(β) > 0 ∀ β ∈ [β0,β1],a n dh(β)=0otherwise.
These sources of uncertainty are resolved at date t =2 .A f t e r t h e t r u e v a l u e s o f θ
and β are revealed the government chooses τ. The takings rule, τ, is a function of
productivity, θ, the alternative private value of the land, β, the level of tree planting,
x, and the compensation payment, K.
When property rights are revoked the logger is paid K(θx). We assume that
K(θx) can be committed to in that once a schedule is established in law–say, by
being enshrined in a constitution–it must be followed. We will sometimes refer to
θx as the “market value” of the land because if the logger’s property rights were not
taken the output would be sold be for θx.5 Note that the compensation schedule is
not a function of β. We believe that, although market values can be made veriﬁable
5Implicitly, we equate the logger’s value of his property with the market value. Knetsch and
Borcherding (1979) point out that in many instances market value may understate the value that
the owner attaches to his property. An implication of this situation is that there may be excessive
takings because market value does not capture the true opportunity cost of the land.
4to a court of law, it would be extremely diﬃcult, if not impossible, to verify the
alternative private value. Thus, one can interpret the compensation schedule, K(θx),
as an incomplete contract.















We assume that β1 >θ 1; this can be interpreted to mean that for every possible
private value θx, there exists an alternative private value, β, that exceeds it. We also
assume that L(x;K,τ) is strictly concave in x.
The camper does not make production or investment decisions. He receives the
beneﬁt, β, from any takings decision and pays compensation K to the logger. The










c(x,θ,β) ≡ (1 − τ(θ,β,K,x))(β − K(θx)).
In practice, policy is implemented by governments who are inﬂuenced by personal
and political considerations.6 We capture this notion simply by assuming that the
government cares only about either the logger or the camper. We use the term
“government moral hazard” to refer to the fact that the government’s preferences






where ω =1if the government cares only about the logger and ω =0if the gov-
ernment cares only about the camper. It may be the case that the government is
indiﬀerent between taking and retaining property rights: We therefore assume the
following,
Assumption A: In the event that the government is indiﬀerent between taking and
not taking, it will choose the action that maximizes social welfare.
We assume for simplicity that the compensation rule is linear, K(θx)=a +
bθx. This rule captures a combination of two compensation schemes that have been
6F o ra ne x c e l l e n ts u r v e ya n da p p l i c a t i o no ft h i sa p p r o a c hs e eG r o s s m a na n dH e l p m a n( 1 9 9 4 ) .
See also, Laﬀont and Tirole (1993, Part V).
5suggested in the literature: (1) a ﬁxed payment, (i.e., a>0 and b =0 )a n d( 2 )
market value compensation (i.e., b =1and a =0 ).7
The social planner’s problem can be viewed as a single principal, two agent prob-






L(x;K,τ) ≥ L(˜ x;K,τ) ∀ ˜ x ∈ [0,1] (3)
and ∀ β ∈ [β0,β1] and ∀ θ ∈ [θ0,θ 1]
Gω(τ;x,K) ≥ Gω(˜ τ;x,K), ∀ ˜ τ ∈ {0,1}. (4)
The constraints (3) and (4) represent the incentive constraints for the logger and the
government, respectively. We will refer to h(2),(3),(4)i as the constrained planner’s
problem.
Up to this point we have assumed that the alternative private value of the land is
independent of the level of investment in tree planting. It is not diﬃcult, however, to
think of examples where the level of private investment aﬀects the alternative value
of the asset. For example, when logging ﬁrms invest in cultivation and reforestation,
they enhance value of the land in the event that land is taken and converted into a
park. In contrast, private investment can have a negative impact on its alternative
value if, for instance, it causes environmental damage. In section 5, we will model
this phenomenon and examine how it aﬀects the optimal compensation rule.
We will conclude this section by reviewing the timing of the model. At date t =0
the social planner establishes the compensation rule. At date t =1the logger makes
his investment decision. Uncertainty with regard to θ and β is resolved at date 2
and the government makes its takings decision. At date 3 output is produced and
distributed.
3 First-Best Allocation
As a benchmark, we characterize the ﬁrst-best allocation, which is deﬁned by letting
the planner make both the taking and investment decisions. The planner chooses a
level of investment x ∈ [0,1] and function m:[ θ0,θ 1] → [β0,β1] that determines the
taking decision. Speciﬁcally, the social planner will choose x and m so as to maximize










th(t)f(s)dtds + g(1 − x).
7Non-linear compensation schemes will mirror our results but will do so at the cost of signiﬁcantly
complicating the analysis.
6We assume that this function is strictly concave in x and m(s). It is straightforward









and that the optimal level of private investment is determined by the equality of the
expected marginal productivity of the risky technology and the marginal productivity






0(1 − x)=0 . (6)
Denote the solution to (6) as x∗.
4N o G o v e r n m e n t M o r a l H a z a r d
Although we believe that one can not fully understand compensation practices for
takings without explicitly considering the existence of government moral hazard, in
this section we assume that it does not exist. We do so in order to demonstrate that
our model is a “standard one” in the sense that, absent government moral hazard,
compensation for a taking will not be linked to market value.
In this setting, the takings decision is governed by (5). Given the compensation












(a + bsx)h(t)f(s)dtds + g(1 − x),

























7Then it is straightforward to see that the unique solution to equation (7) is x = x∗.
Hence, the ﬁrst-best allocation, described by (5) and (6), can be achieved without
having compensation depend upon market value. In practice, this compensation rule
might be problematic to implement because the eﬃcient level of investment, x∗,a n d
the distribution of productivities must be common knowledge. That being said, we
emphasize that the point of this section is to simply demonstrate that the basic
structure of our model is similar to other models in the literature and we can draw
the same conclusions with respect to market value compensation.
The intuition behind the compensation rule given by (8) and b =0is simple.
Suppose that a = b =0 . In addition to increasing output, an increase in investment
increases the private value of tree planting which implies that the probability of land
being taken is reduced. This provides an added element to the return to investment
for the logger and, hence, will result in overinvestment. This incentive to overinvest is,
however, oﬀset by every dollar of lump sum compensation that is paid in the event of
taking and the lump sum given by (8) completely oﬀsets the incentive to overinvest.8
Our result is consistent with BRS in showing that ﬁrst best can be achieved with
compensation that is independent of market value. It contrasts, however, with BRS
in showing that the lump sum compensation is not arbitrary and, importantly, that
a 6=0 . The diﬀerence in results can be explained by the fact that in our model–and
in contrast to BRS–private investment aﬀects the probability of taking. This in turn
introduces an incentive to overinvest and, hence, the need to oﬀset this through a
speciﬁc lump sum payment.9
5 No Government Moral Hazard, Investment Af-
fects Alternative Value
In this section we continue to assume the absence of government moral hazard but
depart from the assumption that the alternative value of land is independent of the
level of private investment x.
In order to make our point most clearly we simplify by assuming that β has a two
point distribution over the set {0,β1}, with h(β) > 0 for β ∈ {0,β1} and h(β)=0
otherwise. We now denote alternative private value of land as γ(β,x), where the value
depends upon both the campers “base private valuation”, β, and the level of tree
8The compensation rule is not unique. For example, for any b, 0 ≤ b ≤ 1, there exists an a
that can implement the ﬁrst-best. Intuitively, an increase in b increases the incentive to (over)invest
while increasing a oﬀsets this eﬀect.
9We can show that the BRS result is a special case of our analysis. The intuition of this can
be seen by examining the ﬁrst order condition (7). The second term of this condition reﬂects the
marginal beneﬁt of decreasing the probability of a taking by increasing investment. In a model
where the taking decision is independent of the level investment, as in BRS, this middle term is not
present. Inspection of (7) absent the middle term reveals that the ﬁrst best level of investment is
implemented if b is set equal to zero. This is eﬀectively the BRS result.
8planting, x.W ea s s u m et h a tγ(β,0) = β, γ(0,x)=0and γ(β1,x) >θ 1 ∀ x ∈ [0,1].
These assumptions imply that the level of tree planting, x,d o e sn o ta ﬀect the takings
decision. Private investment will be “beneﬁcial” to the alternative value of land if
γx > 0 and will not be if γx < 0.
We begin by characterizing the ﬁrst best allocation for this economy. The social







sxf(s)ds + h(β1)γ(β1,x)+g(1 − x), (9)




sf(s)ds + h(β1)γx(β1,x) − g
0(1 − x)=0 . (10)
Note that the term h(β1)γx(β1,x) in this equation reﬂects the eﬀe c tt h a tt r e ep l a n t i n g
has on the alternative private value.
The level of investment chosen by the logger reﬂects both the taking decision of
the social planner and the compensation rule K = a+bθx. The level of tree planting








0(1 − x)=0 . (11)






then the ﬁrst-best level of investment will be achieved. Therefore, the optimal com-
pensation schedule is given by K = a +ˆ bθx,w h e r ea can take on any value.
The link between market value and compensation induces the logger to internalize
the social value of private investment. On the other hand, the lump sum component
of this compensation rule can take on any value for the same reason that it does in
BRS since the two point distribution does not aﬀect the probability of a taking.
6 Government Moral Hazard, Only Campers Mat-
ter
In this section we assume that ω =0in (1). Here, the government will take the
logger’s property rights whenever the private alternative beneﬁt of doing so exceeds
9compensation, i.e., whenever β ≥ a+bθx. Hence, the logger’s optimal amount of tree












(a + bsx)h(t)f(s)dtds + g(1 − x),




















bsh(t)f(s)dtds =0 . (12)












th(t)f(s)dtds + g(1 − x),
subject to constraint (12). The ﬁrst order conditions for the planner’s problem with





























2x − as − 3bs
2x
¢






























h(a + bsx)f(s)ds + g
00(1 − x)) = 0, (15)
where λ is the multiplier associated with constraint (12). The following proposition
demonstrates that compensation will depend on market value.
Proposition 1 When the government only cares about the camper’s welfare, the
optimal compensation rule will depend upon the market value, i.e., b 6=0 .






0(1 − x), (16)






0(1 − x) − λg
00(1 − x). (17)
Equations (16) and (17) imply that λ =0 , i.e., if compensation is not linked to market
value, then the investment distortion constraint (12) is not binding. If b = λ =0 ,












2) 6=( E(θ))2,t h el u m ps u mp a y m e n ta (with b =0 )c a nn o ts a t i s f y
both of these equations, a contradiction. Therefore, it can not be that b =0 . ¤
The implication of Proposition 1 is that market value is an important tool in
aligning the interests of the logger and the government with that of the social planner.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is that, when the government is concerned only
with the welfare of the camper, he must be induced to internalize the cost of foregone
output, θx, and this can only be achieved by making the compensation schedule
depend upon θx. To see this, suppose that b is set to zero and a>0.I nt h i sc a s e ,
the government will take whenever β>a , independent of the value of lost output.
But an eﬃcient taking decision requires a comparison of θx with β.W h e nb 6=0 ,t h e
government’s decision will reﬂect a measure of foregone output via the compensation
schedule and, thus, “improves” the takings decision. The optimal compensation rule
will have a ≥ 0 and 0 <b<1.T h u sh a v i n ga>0 and 0 <b<1: (i) improves the
“overinvestment problem” compared to a compensation scheme that speciﬁes a =0
and b =1and (ii) improves the ex post takings decision compared to a compensation
rule that speciﬁes a>0 and b =0 .
7 Government Moral Hazard, Only Loggers Mat-
ter
In this section we assume that ω =1in (1). The preferences of the government now
imply that land will be taken whenever a + bθx ≥ θx. It turns out that the optimal
compensation rule will take one of two forms: Either a =0and b =1or a>0 and
b =0 . That is, either compensation will be equal to market value or independent of
market value. When a =0and b =1 , the government will be indiﬀerent between
taking or not. But according to assumption A, the government will make the socially
11optimal taking decision and, therefore, compares market value with the alternative
value of the land. However, when a>0 and b =0the alternative value of land
does not come into play for the takings decision. The social planner will select the
compensation rule, i.e., either a =0and b =1or a>0 and b =0 , which delivers the
highest level of social welfare.
7.1 Compensation Rule: b =1
It turns out that when b =1it will never be optimal to have a 6=0 . First note that,




0(1 − x)=0 . (18)
If a<0, then the government will never take land; if a>0, then the government
will always take land. Both of these takings policies are ineﬃcient. In contrast, when
a =0 , the government is indiﬀerent between taking and not and, by assumption A
will make the eﬃcient takings decision. If the social planner chooses a =0and b =1 ,
then expected social welfare, SWc(a =0 ,b=1 ) , will be
SW











Note that there is an overinvestment in tree planting, i.e., compare equation (18)
with the equation that describe the socially optimal level of investment, (6).
7.2 Compensation Rule: b 6=1



















f(s)ds + g(1 − x),









0(1 − x)=0 . (19)












th(t)f(s)dsdt + g(1 − x), (20)









































where λ is the multiplier associated with constraint (19). Note that equation (21) is
identical to the ﬁrst four terms of equation (22). This means that if a/((1−b)x) >θ 0,10
then last term in (22) is strictly positive and both equations (21) and (22) can only
hold if λ =0 .
The planner’s constraint (19) will not bind, i.e., λ =0 , if the logger’s investment
decision coincides with what the planner would pick. The planner would choose the





0(1 − x)=0 . (23)
Comparing (19) with (23), the decisions coincide only if b =0 . Substituting λ =0
and b =0into either equation (21) or (22) we arrive at a = E(β),w h e r eE(β)= R β1
β0 th(t)dt. If the social planner chooses a = E(β) and b =0 , then the expected
social welfare, SWc(a = E(β),b=0 ) , will be
SW











10If a/((1 − b)x) ≤ θ0, then the government will never take since the region over which the
government takes is [θ0,a/((1−b)x)]. If the government never takes, then the level of tree planting
is given by (18). But in this situation the social planner will strictly prefer a compensation rule that
speciﬁes a =0and b =1 .
137.3 The Optimal Compensation Rule
The above analysis shows that the social planner need only consider two possible
compensation rules: either ( a =0 ,b=1 )o r(a = E(β),b=0 ). The social
planner’s decision will be determined by comparing SWc(a = E(β),b =0 )with
SWc(a =0 ,b =1 ) :I f SWc(a =0 ,b =1 )≥ SWc(a = E(β),b =0 ) ,t h e ns o c i a l
planner will chose a =0and b =1in the compensation rule; otherwise the social
planner will choose a = E(β) and b =0 .
We have shown that the social planner will either choose to impose a market
value based compensation rule or one that is independent of market value. A natural
question to ask is whether or not there are any parameter values that imply that
market value will be used. If the expected alternative value is less than or equal to the
logger’s minimum output under the lump sum compensation rule, i.e., if E(β) ≤ θ0˜ x,
then the government will never take. In this situation market value compensation will
dominate because it gives the same level of investment in tree planting but delivers
an eﬃcient takings decision.
We may summarize the analysis and discussion contained in this section in the
following proposition,
Proposition 2 If the government cares only about the logger’s welfare, then the
optimal compensation will be a payment that is equal to either the expected alternative
private value, E(β), or market value, θx.I fE(β) ≤ θ0˜ x, then the optimal compen-
sation will be equal to the market value. By continuity, if θ0˜ x>E (β) and is in the
neighborhood of E(β), then the optimal compensation will be equal to market value.
8 Summary and Conclusions
The BRS study presents an elegant and compelling case for a simple and easily
implementable compensation rule: Compensation should be zero. But in the presence
of government moral hazard we have shown that market value will generally be an
important factor in the compensation rule.
On the one hand, the sensitivity of the compensation rule to political inﬂuence
suggests that it is dangerous to leave the compensation rule up to the government of
t h ed a y .W es h o wh o ww e l f a r ei si m p r o v e db yc o m m i t t i n gt h eg o v e r n m e n tt oar u l e
that forces recognition of factors they would rather ignore.
On the other hand, however, our analysis indicates how diﬃcult the task of pre-
specifying a compensation rule actually is. In particular, the speciﬁc link between
market value and compensation is not simple as it depends on the social value of
private investment, the speciﬁc form of the production functions, the nature of tech-
nological uncertainty, the preferences of the government and, possibly, the socially
eﬃcient levels of investment. Clearly, from a practical point of view, it would be
extremely diﬃcult to enshrine a compensation rule into a constitution that depended
14upon preferences, technology, etc. What then, from a practical point of view,d o e s
our analysis imply for a compensation rule?
We can think of few cases where the government grants property rights when there
is a high probability that these rights will be taken. Instead, governments seem to
retain these property rights or, perhaps, leases them, but does not sell them. This
suggests that the most relevant cases are those where the ex ante probability of a
taking is “low.” Hence, based on our analysis, consideration of the practical diﬃculty
of implementing various compensation schemes and the observation that the ex ante
probability of a taking is low, we feel that market value compensation is best for a
number of reasons.
First, we can argue that when the probability of property being taken is relatively
low, market value compensation is attractive. This view reﬂects two of our results.
When governments favor property owners, we have shown that market value is optimal
when the expected alternative private value is “low.” Low expected alternative private
value implies that there is a relatively high probability that a low alternative private
value will be observed. Hence, for a given market value, a low expected alternative
private value is associated with a relatively low probability of a taking. On the other
hand, when governments favor campers, the optimal compensation is a lump sum
plus a percentage of the market value. However, when the probability of a taking is
small, the lump sum component, a, becomes small and the fraction of market value, b,
approaches one. Hence, even here the optimal compensation will not be signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from market value compensation.
Second, as mentioned above, when compensation is lump sum, implementation
generally requires foreknowledge of optimal production, investment, etc. As a prac-
tical matter, it is not obvious that governments have the ability to assess optimal
production for private ﬁrms. We have shown that the diﬀerence between market
value and the optimal compensation becomes small as the probability of a taking is
small. Hence, for cases where there is a small ex ante chance of a taking, market value
compensation is an easily implementable scheme that has relatively small (welfare)
costs associated with it.
Third, our analysis assumes that the constitution is designed with perfect knowl-
edge of who the government will favor. In practice, the preferences of those in power
change through the political process. Unfortunately, a constitution cannot be made
contingent on the preferences of the government of the day. Therefore, it is reasonable
to assume a single rule must be adopted independent of the government preferences.
Since market value is optimal for some government preferences, and have relatively
low cost for other preferences, it is in our view the preferred choice.
In this study we consider the role of compensation rules in both private invest-
ment decisions and government decisions. The novel feature of our analysis is an
allowance for politically motivated implementation that may diverge from socially
optimal implementation. Previous studies have focused on investment eﬃciency and
have concluded that compensation based on market value is ineﬃcient. The main
15result of our investigation is the discovery that, in most cases, an eﬃcient compen-
sation schedule must reﬂect market value. We have demonstrated what is, we feel,
intuitively obvious: Requiring decision makers to pay market value forces them to
internalize economic costs that their political concerns would cause them to ignore.
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